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The concept and study of transitional justice has grown exponentially 
over the last decades. Since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after the 
end of the Second World War, there have been a number of attempts 
made across the globe to achieve justice for human rights violations 
(International Peace Institute 2013: 10). How these attempts at 
achieving justice impact whether or not societies reconcile, continues 
to be one of the key discussions taking place in a transitional justice 
discourse. One particular context where this debate continues to 
rage on is in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many scholars argue that the 
transitional justice process and mechanism employed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina have not fostered inter-group reconciliation, but in fact 
caused more divisions. To this end, this article explores the context 
of transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina from a unique 
perspective that focuses on the need for reconciliation and healing 
after transitional justice processes like war crime prosecutions. This 
article explores why the prosecuting of war criminals has not fostered 
reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and how the processes 
have divided Bosnian society further. Additionally, this article 
presents the idea of state-sponsored dialog sessions as a way of 
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Introduction
Societies emerging from a period of conflict have the arduous 
tasks of rebuilding damaged infrastructure, maintaining 
security, developing new institutions, and figuring how to 
deal with past atrocities. Dealing with the past is not only a 
legal question, but it is also a philosophical one as well. One 
of the mechanisms that have been used, in both international 
and domestic contexts to deal with past human rights abuses 
and atrocities, has been prosecutions. Some positive aspects 
of prosecutions are that they punish perpetrators, vindicate 
victims, extract the forensic truth, and help to establish the rule 
of law and respect for human rights in transitioning societies. 
However, one major negative aspect of prosecutions is that they 
can also cause further divides in societies where there was 
violence along ethnic cleavages. Who to prosecute and for what 
becomes political, especially when there is competing narratives 
about how the atrocities began and why. This has been the case 
surrounding prosecutions following the 1992-1995 Bosnian 
War by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and domestic prosecutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. For many in Bosnia and Herzegovina the path to 
justice and reconciliation has been a long and overwhelmingly 
exhaustive process. Regardless of the prosecutions in The 
Hague or the country’s war crimes chamber many Bosnians 
feel disillusioned, angry, and cheated by the outcome. Now 
that the ICTY has officially closed, prosecuting war crimes did 
not bring healing or reconciliation to the Bosnian society and 
it actually had a negative impact on fostering better inter-
ethnic relations. Prosecutions have left some Bosnians (Serbs 
in particular) feeling that their ethnic group has been treated 
unfairly or that crimes committed against their ethnic group 
did not receive equal justice compared to cases from other 
ethnic groups. On the other hand, some feel that the sentences 
handed down in The Hague or in the domestic courts were 
not long enough in relation to the crimes committed and not 
everyone who participated in the wartime atrocities has been 
brought to justice.  
Needless to say, the current process of prosecuting former 
war criminals alone has not been enough to move Bosnia and 
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inter-group reconciliation. There must be additional non-
judicial processes used. I argue that state sponsored dialogue 
sessions are a mechanism that would be an effective way to 
deal with the past and help foster a new post-war narrative that 
is representative of all Bosnians and their wartime experiences. 
To explicate this topic further, this article first explores the 
notion of post-conflict societal reconciliation, then the nexus 
between reconciliation and retributive justices. After which, I 
then discuss the two primary processes that have been used to 
prosecute war crimes, the ICTY and the War Crimes Chamber 
of the Prosecutors Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and why 
they particularly have not fostered senses of reconciliation in 
Bosnian society. Finally, I will discuss and ruminate on the 
concept of state-sponsored dialogue sessions and they can 
best serve as an instrument to move Bosnia and Herzegovina 
forward.
Understanding the concept of reconciliation 
In the aftermath of conflict or communal violence, societies 
often aim to address the wounds and issues of the past that 
led to conflict in the first place. This is what practitioners 
and peace scholars have come to term as reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is a complex term that has no one singular 
definition, it is pluralistic in meaning and varies from one 
society to the next. For instance, according to Clark (quoted 
in Bell: 2018) reconciliation largely involves the rebuilding of 
broken individual and communal relationships after conflict, 
that orients toward meaningful interaction and cooperation 
between former enemies. Reconciliation also means parties 
coming up with ways of how and what to remember from 
the past, and how these memories will impact the future of 
society. Similarly, Lederach (1997) explains that the process of 
reconciliation represents a place or a point of encounter where 
the concerns of both the past and the future meet. He further 
asserts that reconciliation, as an encounter, suggests that space 
for the acknowledgement of the past and envisioning the future 
is a necessary ingredient for reconfiguring the present. Some 
scholars argue that this process allows citizens with former 
hostilities to begin to trust each other again and commit to 
rebuilding relationships that foster positive interactions 
between them.  However, some scholars see reconciliation as 









XXV (84) 2019, 
54-77
hot conflict or violence. In this way Gibson (quoted in Chapman: 
2009) offers a different sentimentality than the other authors 
earlier by asserting that reconciliation does not require that 
people accept and embrace one another, but only that they be 
willing to put up with whom they oppose. Put simply, members 
of society only need to co-exist with one another.
Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyseis (2003: 12) add to this discussion 
by explaining that it applies to everyone and not just a process 
for direct victims and perpetrators. The authors further assert 
that “the attitudes and beliefs that underpin violent conflict 
spread much more generally through a community and must 
be addressed at that broad level. So, while there is a crucial 
individual element to reconciliation, there is also a community-
wide element that demands a questioning of the attitudes, 
prejudices and negative stereotypes that are developed about 
“the enemy during violent conflict”. (Bloomfield, Barnes and 
Huyseis 2003: 12). 
Under the guise of the community element that is mentioned 
above, I will focus my analysis in this paper on inter-group 
dynamics of reconciliation. What does the notion of inter-group 
reconciliation grapple with exactly?  According to Stover and 
Weinstein (2004), inter-group level reconciliation involves the 
reconfiguration of identity, the revisiting of prior social roles, 
the search for a common identity, agreement about unifying 
memories and not myths, and development of collaborative 
relationships that allow for differences. In order to create some 
sort of common identity, there must first be a discussion about 
which narratives make it into a post-conflict society’s national 
psyche. The stories of the once conflicting parties have to match 
and make sense collectively. 
Along these lines, Auerbach (2009: 300) suggests that the process 
of reconciliation will only be completed if adversarial groups 
communicate their stories and publically form a common 
history. He further argues that the public narrative needs to 
consider positive and negative behaviors of both sides of the 
conflict and incorporate them into a common narrative for 
all (Auerbach 2009: 300). While processes at the ICTY and the 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina have yielded a plethora of 
facts and figures about the war, very few of them have made 
it into the common national narrative. This is quite evident in 
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politicians for political fodder. This rampant genocide denial 
continues to anger and vex Bosnian Muslims and Croats, which 
in turn fuels more distrust and anger.
Furthermore, to get a bit deeper, I would argue that for inter-
group reconciliation to take place in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
there must be a process dedicated to socio-emotional 
reconciliation. Nadler and Nurit (2015: 98) maintain that this 
process focuses on the removal of threats posed to the conflict 
parties’ identities due to their involvement in the conflict. The 
authors further posit that social psychological research on 
the role of emotions such as guilt, shame, hatred, humiliation, 
and vengeance in maintaining and escalating conflict and 
on the positive effects of defusing these feelings on ending 
conflicts members’ sense of adequate identity can block or, 
if removed, facilitate reconciliation. In Bosnia at a national 
and collective level this has never happened; the processes 
dedicated to dealing with the past, have unfortunately only 
enforced feelings of guilt, hatred, shame, and resentment, 
fuelling competing narratives. According to Vukosavljević 
(2007), there is a strong need for deconstructing enemy images 
and overcoming “victimisation”, which is a widespread (self-) 
perception in Bosnia and other Western Balkan countries where 
societies tend to label whole groups (nations) as either victims 
or perpetrators of violence. This is why I argue that a process like 
dialogue sessions can be helpful in understanding currently 
held images and identities, and how they can be shifted.
Connecting reconciliation and retributive justice: the pros and 
cons
Before moving forward to discuss the ICTY and Domestic 
Trials and their impacts on inter-group reconciliation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, I believe it is pertinent to have a 
general discussion on reconciliation and its links to retributive 
justice. When we consider the concept of reconciliation, we see 
it does not stand alone and often largely hinges upon notions 
of justice. Justice, like reconciliation, has different dimensions 
that happen in different time frames and developments across 
post-conflict societal contexts. Malek (2013) furthers these 
sentiments by arguing that reconciliation is a process that 
draws on truth, justice, and mercy to turn temporary peace into 
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to what transitional justice and their processes are designed 
for. Transitional justice is a field that has emerged within the 
last 35 years as a process and mechanism to help societies 
that were once in conflict establish a new social, political, and 
legal order that redresses the wrongs of the past and lays the 
foundation for the rule of law. 
Transitional justice processes also serve as a means of 
aiding reconciliation processes by helping to establish the 
truth, assure justice, and help victims gain closure from the 
wrongs committed against them through state-sanctioned 
or communal violence. Seils (2017) adds to this discussion 
by noting that despite the complexity of reconciliation, 
transitional justice processes are capable of contributing to 
reconciliation through the outcomes and processes of discourse 
and participation. Additionally, Kriesberg (2007: 3) states that 
in post-conflict situations those who have suffered oppression 
and atrocities in the course of an intense struggle seek redress 
for the injustices they endured. He further maintains that 
justice like reconciliation is not a simple matter, since justice 
itself is multifaceted. Justice means different things to different 
people and often times societies have a difficult time trying to 
establish a means and method of justice agreed by everyone.
Another particular question that has arisen in transitional 
discourse also closely related to reconciliation is whether, or not, 
societies should seek peace or justice. The peace versus justice 
paradigm maintains that often times in post-conflict settings 
justice processes can be controversial and undermine peace. 
Proponents of the peace side of the debate claim that pursuing 
justice and accountability in an already tense environment 
may exacerbate inter-group conflict and undermine peace, 
while their opponents on the side for justice and accountability 
argue that long term peace is not sustainable without justice 
and accountability. Rigby (2001) notes that the peace versus 
justice debate comes down to a matter of “forgive and forget” 
past crimes or “persecute and punish” the perpetrators who 
committed the crimes.
One of the key debates that follow the peace versus justice 
debate is what type of mechanism and method of justice is 
appropriate to redress massive human rights crimes. One of 
the key methods that has been utilized across the world has 
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maintains that those who have committed crimes or who have 
again unfair advantages through their behavior should be 
punished. Maise (2004: para.4) similarly argues that retributive 
justice is backward-looking and that punishment is warranted 
as a response to a past event of injustice or wrongdoing. The 
author also maintains that it acts to reinforce rules that have 
been broken and balance the scales of justice (Maise 2004: 
para.4). Two of the key mechanisms of retributive justice 
used in transitional settings are trials and tribunals. “Trials 
and/or tribunals can take place on a domestic level or at an 
international level, they are designed to prosecute and punish 
perpetrators for their crimes” (Bell 2015: 4).  
Some scholars support trials and tribunals as the primary 
way for post-conflict societies to move beyond that the dark 
shadows of conflict. It is often believed that one major pro 
concerning retributive justice and reconciliation is that 
punishing individuals helps in not blaming an entire group 
for committing atrocities. For instance, Kriesberg (2007: 4) 
maintains that for advancing reconciliation, punishing 
individuals for past violations of human rights is a way of 
identifying individual responsibility and avoiding attributing 
collective guilt, which may create new injustices and be a source 
of new resentments. This can be a major factor in helping to 
improve inter-group relations, when one group no longer 
sees another group as entirely responsible for their loss and 
suffering. 
Another major benefit often attributed to retributive justice 
is that it allows for post-conflict societies to face the past, 
punish those involved, and lay the foundations for societies 
to move on with no “unfinished” business. Along these lines, 
Moghalu (as cited in Clark 2008: 332) maintains that  “when 
justice is done, and seen to be done, it provides a catharsis for 
those physically or psychologically scarred by violations of 
international humanitarian law. In this regard, retributive 
justice can foster better inter-group relations, as deep-seated 
resentments – which are often key obstacles to reconciliation 
– are removed and people on different sides of the divide can
feel that a clean slate has been provided for. Another major pro
ascribed to retributive methods such as tribunals and trials
is that they provided victims’ families and communities an
opportunity to feel in control and regain a sense of power that
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(McMorran 2003: para.6). McMorran (2003: para.6) argues that it is 
empowering for victims to stand up in a court of law and identify 
those who wronged them. The author further notes that a war 
crimes tribunal can also reveal forgotten or hidden atrocities to 
be retold by survivors, as well as a key way to hold war criminals 
to account for their crimes (McMorran 2003: para.6). 
Now that the pros have been discussed concerning retributive 
justice what are some of the cons? One key weakness of 
retributive justice processes is that there is no guarantee that 
trials and tribunals will actually foster reconciliation. As noted 
above, it is hoped that these methods of retributive justice 
may help societies comes to grips with the past, but nothing 
can be assured. Just because the truth has been established 
forensically, it does not mean that it will defeat competing 
narratives of a conflict. For instance, currently the Bosnian 
Serbs, as a group, will not recognize the murdering of 8,000 men 
and boys in Srebrenica as an act of genocide committed by the 
Bosnian Serb forces. On the other hand, Bosnian Muslims do 
recognise it and seek to memorialize these murders as such. As 
will be discussed later, there is also continuous debate about 
what ethnic group played what role during the war, as to who 
was the aggressor and who was the defendant. To reiterate 
what I said earlier, facts do not always translate into a shared 
or common history, especially amongst groups with competing 
tales of victimization.
Another major con is that it is impossible for trials and 
tribunals, whether held domestically or internationally, to 
prosecute all those who participated in major human rights 
violations. Today in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many victims 
live beside those who committed atrocities during the war and 
have never been prosecuted. The notion that a trial or tribunal 
can address all post-conflict justice issues is a misguided one, 
because they simply cannot. Any such notion, sold by domestic 
or international tribunal officials may lead to victims feeling 
unsatisfied with the processes of justice and leave them feeling 
cheated. Mobekk (2005: 271) explains that reconciliation cannot 
be obtained by one transitional mechanism alone; and the 
process takes more time and effort than any time-restricted 
trial can achieve.
Another major con (arguably the key one) attributed to war 
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root causes of the conflict (McMorran 2003). The seemingly 
just punish the perpetrators for their crimes, but this does 
not always transform societies. McMorran (2003) argues that 
tribunals can fuel conflict, especially in multi-ethnic societies. 
Especially, cases of genocide, where those accused of war 
crimes are usually all from one particular ethnic group. To 
this specific group, a war crimes tribunal can appear to be an 
indictment on their whole ethnicity, not just those responsible 
(McMorran 2003). It is common to hear discussions from some 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina where blanket accusations about 
wartime atrocities were placed upon a whole group and not the 
individuals who have committed them. 
Moreover, within the same vein Skaar (2013: 16) maintains that 
some scholars suggest that prosecuting perpetrators of human 
rights after periods of conflict may undermine peace and lead 
to renewed violence or an increase in repression. The author 
further maintains that many scholars also argue that “digging 
up the past in post conflict settings can trigger new tensions by 
provoking a backlash on the part of those to be prosecuted – 
and hence limit the possibilities for reconciliation” (Skaar 2013: 
16). In addition, trials and tribunals there may not actually 
impact both individuals and groups the same way. Stover and 
Weinstein (2004: 18) argue that reconciliation must take place 
at the group level as well as at the individual level. The outcome 
of trials and tribunals may not translate into reconciliation on 
for an entire group, and definitely not between groups. Some 
individuals across groups may be gratified or feel vindicated, 
but that does not mean that a whole ethnic, political, or social 
group may feel the same. 
Another key question that arises in transitional justice 
discourse, as it relates to trials and tribunals, is whether 
tribunals held outside of the particular context in which the 
crimes were committed can actually be effective in promoting 
reconciliation. Some scholars point to the cases of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and the ICTY and argue that international 
justice has its limitations within domestic contexts. Clark 
(2008: 333) suggests that when mass crimes are committed, 
they impact whole societies. She also argues that it is whole 
societies who therefore must be involved as much as possible 
in the reconciliation process (Clark 2008: 333). Staub (As cited in 
Clark 2008: 33) maintains that “effective reconciliation requires 
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society, from members of the population whose psychological 
orientation is the core to reconciliation, to national leaders who 
can shape policies, practices and institutions”. Another major 
aspect to consider is that for transitional justice processes to be 
effective in fostering healing and reconciliation, there must be 
a sense of local ownership among the local population. Haider 
(2016: 9) maintains that for transitional justice initiatives to be 
effective local ownership of the processes are essential. For the 
reasons mentioned above, international trials and tribunals do 
not exactly afford local populations a sense of ownership over 
the processes. Haider (2016: 9) also argues that while considering 
universal standards for justice is important, local perceptions 
of just must also be considered. She further notes that while 
legal trials may honour the victims of gross human rights 
violations in neo-liberal/Western terms, it may not appropriate 
for all settings and cultures. I would argue that there is an 
important connection to what Haider says immediately above 
and that of what Nadler and Nurit (2015) mention concerning 
the socio-emotional aspects of different groups after a conflict, 
trials may stand as a way to hold perpetrators accountable, but 
they do not necessarily deal with the socio-emotional remnants 
of conflict in a way that helps different groups confront their 
negative images of one another. Trials can reinforce the shame, 
hurt, and bitterness. Additionally, after conflict, many groups 
that have been impacted by gross human rights violations or 
communal violence carry collective traumas and memories 
that trials or tribunals simply may not be able to address.
Complicated justice: the ICTY and domestic war crimes trials in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina their impacts on reconciliation
The war  from 1992 to 1995 in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
undoubtedly changed the lives of many Bosnians forever. 
Fellow citizens of all ethnicities, religions, and creeds who had 
lived as neighbours and friends for decades became enemies 
as nationalist rhetoric from within and outside the country 
sought to tear relations apart. It has been estimated that more 
than 100,000 people perished, while millions of others had 
to flee their homes during the Bosnian War between 1992 to 
1995. It has also been estimated that 20,000 to 50,000 women 
were brutally and systematically raped across Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Turton 2017), while concentration camps were 
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were mistreated, starved, and beaten. Additionally, one of the 
worst atrocities that Europe had seen since the Holocaust 
occurred in early July of 1995, when more than 8,000 Bosnian 
Muslim men and boys were murdered by Bosnian Serb forces 
in act of genocide designed to cleanse Eastern Bosnia of all 
Muslims. These heinous crimes and atrocities committed in 
the name of this nationalistic rhetoric has rendered Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and its people wounded physically and 
emotionally. Twenty-three years after the war has ended, 
despite the information that gathered through the ICTY, 
domestic war crime trials, and a variety of other ad hoc locally 
based initiatives; Bosnia and Herzegovina is still struggling to 
come to grips with what happen and to develop a narrative of 
the war that all Bosnians can live with.  
The topic of transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
been discussed to a point of ad nauseam for many of its citizens. 
Bell (2018b: 3) maintains that “many Bosnians are disillusioned 
by talk of justice and reconciliation and have lost faith, 
especially in the government to foster any form of transitional 
justice”. The author further explains that in a country where 
many of the same political factions who jockeyed for war some 
20 years ago are still relatively in power and where a plethora 
of development and economic issues exist, the possibility of 
any post-conflict justice and reconciliation seems improbable 
to most. As Bosnians continue to live with the past, while 
trying to move on with their lives, it is important to consider 
how the aforementioned processes of both international and 
domestic war crime trials have had on the process of inter 
group reconciliation.  I would argue that the impact has been 
minimal and actually, as noted earlier has done more damage 
to ethnic relations than good. To this end, I will first discuss the 
international trials based at the ICTY in The Hague, Netherlands 
and then I will discuss the domestic trials prosecuted by the 
War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
ICTY
The ICTY was a United Nations devised tribunal that was in 
operation from 1993-2017. The ICTY was the first international 
tribunal to be devised after World War II. The main goals of the 
ICTY were to try those individuals most responsible for heinous 
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of property and other crimes listed in the Tribunal’s Statute 
(United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia 2017a: para.15). By bringing perpetrators to trial, 
the Tribunal aimed to deter future crimes and yield justice to 
thousands of victims and their families, thereby contributing 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other Yugoslav States 
(UNICTY 2017a: para.15). Over its 24-year period the ICTY indicted 
162 and sentenced 84 individuals, this process heard over 4,650 
witness testimonies and yielded 2.5 million pages of transcript 
(UNICTY 2017b). I believe, as will be discussed further in this 
chapter, that while the ICTY’s legacy is mixed, it can be said that 
there are clear achievements that should be celebrated. The main 
achievement is that justice was rendered justice on behalf of 
thousands of people, who without the process at the ICTY would 
have likely not had it. Along these lines, Zylber and Pernik “assert 
that the activity of the tribunal has contributed considerably to 
promoting and strengthening the rule of law and in ensuring 
individual accountability for mass atrocity crimes, both at the 
international level and domestically” (2016: 7).
However, despite these facts, the ICTY and its processes remain 
controversial for many Bosnians. Many Bosnians are unsure 
as to whether or not the processes rendered justice, let alone 
contributed towards reconciliation among amongst the three 
different ethnic groups. Stover and Weinstein (as cited in Bell 
2018b) also offer some insight into the question of the justice 
and the legitimacy of the ICTY. The authors note that although 
the vast majority of witnesses they had interviewed supported 
war crimes trials, they were far less certain about whether 
justice had been rendered in the cases in which they testified. In 
addressing the witnesses, Stover and Weinstein (as cited in Bell 
2018b: 57) write that, “Tribunal Justice, they said, was capricious, 
unpredictable, and inevitably incomplete: defendants could be 
acquitted; sentences could be trifling, even laughable, given 
the enormity of the crimes; and verdicts could be overturned”. 
Beyond, this there are many scholars who argue that the ICTY’s 
main purpose was not designed to promote reconciliation 
processes for all post-Yugoslav societies. As I noted earlier, it is 
extremely impossible for the war crime trials or tribunals to try 
all individuals, especially within an international context. The 
ICTY tried the most high-profile cases and the key individuals 
who orchestrated or executed war crimes, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity. The ICTY also was implicit in revealing facts 









XXV (84) 2019, 
54-77
across that globe would have never otherwise known.
However, despite these aspects, this has not led to fostering 
domestic reconciliation within the local context in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  There remains competing versions of victimhood 
and narratives surrounding the war. Kostić (2012) conducted 
a study in 2005 and 2010 that asked respondents about their 
views on transitional justice and whether or not they found 
their particular ethnic group responsible for the brunt of the 
war. His results were intriguing. For instance, when asked in 
2005 if they agreed with the statement, “my people have fought 
only ‘defensive wars,’” an overwhelming majority of Bosniaks 
(85.3%), Serbs (76.2%), and Croats (75.9%) strongly agreed (Kostić 
2011: 655). Although the number of those participants strongly 
agreeing with this statement fell in 2010, especially among 
Bosnian Serb population where 54.7% agreed, the sentiment 
that members of their own community fought a defensive war 
remained consistent across the three ethnicities.  
Kostić (2012) also maintains that during the hearings, there 
was a tendency for individuals to express interest in the 
trials dealing with war crimes against members of their own 
group, while choosing to ignore the trials where individuals 
belonging to their own groups were being prosecuted. These 
tendencies have reinforced ethnocentric narratives about 
the war that continue to persist today. When respondents in 
the same aforementioned study were asked whether or not 
the proceedings of the ICTY were completely fair, 30 percent 
of Muslims felt they totally agreed, compared to 11 percent of 
Croats and 4 percent of Serbs. 
These sentiments expressed in Kostić’s study are still 
entrenched in Bosnian social and political life today. Due to a 
lack of shared narrative and competing victimhood, the ICTY 
has left a bitter feud in Bosnian society that ethno-political 
elites have gladly taken advantage of and used for their own 
political gains. We can see this from the sentencing of wartime 
general Ratko Mladić in November of 2017, who personally 
oversaw the extermination of more than 8,000 Muslim boys and 
men in Srebrenica. Many Bosnian Serbs support still Mladić and 
even consider him a hero, whom they feel had been arrested 
on trumped up charges by The Hague. Mladić and others have 
recently been celebrated in public ways, for instance in the fall 
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Mladić uniformed and saluting, was installed in his Bosnian 
hometown Kalinovik (Makić 2018). The Serbian handball player 
Vlada Mandić, who erected the mural, told press outlets that 
he considered Mladić, who was convicted of genocide by The 
Hague Tribunal, to be a “Serb hero” (Makić 2018). In another 
instance, the former  wartime president of the Republika 
Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Serb-dominated entity) 
Radovan Karadžić, who is also currently serving time in The 
Hague as well for his role in the 1995 genocide and other 
crimes, had a dorm dedicated to him in his honour in  early 
2016.  Other leaders have held concerts, parades, and other 
public events, concerts in support of war criminals across 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. Each glorification serves as 
micro-aggression that further entrenches distrust and 
undermines the inter-group reconciliation process. 
As noted above, the conception that international trials and 
tribunals can foster reconciliation is limited and is evident 
in the Bosnian context. Not only did the Tribunal not foster 
reconciliation, it fueled competing narratives and victimhood.  
Some of the key failures of this are also attributed to the 
lack of engagement with the local population in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Clark (2012) highlights some of these key failures 
by highlighting that by noting that one of the key issues was 
that there was not enough communication with local people, 
which left the ICTY as a poorly understood institution. Along 
these lines Gordy (cited in Ahmetašević 2015) maintains the 
tribunal and local courts never developed a clear idea of who 
their clientele never took enough of an interest in articulating 
or addressing the concerns of victims, or explaining to the local 
public what was being established and what it meant. This, 
according to her, then allowed local press junkets and media 
outlets to put their own spin on what was happening in The 
Hague. Media outlets in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely 
ethno-politicized, so the information that many people were 
receiving was biased and reportedly favourable towards their 
particular ethnic group and their sentences. Some Bosnian 
political elites argued that the process in The Hague was forced 
by the international community and not something locally 
conceived of by Bosnians, therefore its rulings and mandate 
were illegitimate. Now that the ICTY mandate has ended, a lot 
of damage still remains in the fact everyday Bosnians remain 
distrustful of war crime trials in general. Many of the same 
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mirrored in the domestic trials taking place on a daily basis. 
There remains a lingering mistrust for transitional justice 
processes.
Domestic courts
One of the tools that have led to war crime prosecutions in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been the War Crimes Chamber. 
The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Special Department for War Crimes in the Prosecutor’s Office 
was established in 2003, but did not become operational until 
2005. The War Crimes Chamber was designed as part of the State 
court to try some of the most egregious crimes committed 
during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War. In 2008, a War Crimes 
strategy was also adopted; the overall aim of the strategy was to 
lay out a comprehensive process to prosecute the most complex 
and high-level cases within a seven-year time frame. However, 
war crime prosecutions have not kept pace within the time 
frame laid out in the strategy, leaving an already doubtful and 
sceptical nation as to whether or not it can trust its institutions 
to render justice where international courts have not.  
One key issue has been that many Bosnians do not trust or 
respect their domestic institutions to render justice. The 
ongoing corruption and disrespect for the rule of law has 
played a major role in lessening the institutions credibility 
for fostering reconciliation.  Not to mention that war crime 
cases are extremely backlogged with a Prosecutor’s office that 
is ultimately unequipped to deal with them. According to a 
report released in 2013 by the United Nations Development 
Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina some 60.3% of Bosnians 
did not trust their judicial system. Moreover, the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina has been repeatedly attacked by politicians 
from the Republika Srpska that claim the Court proceedings 
single out Serbs, while Croats and Bosnian suspects go free. Bell 
(2018a: 3) explains that “the Republika Srpska administration 
continues to regularly question the authority of federal judicial 
institutions, including the country’s Constitutional Court, State 
Court and Prosecutor’s Office, and HJPC. He further presents 
that some political leaders publicly support war criminals, 
denying that genocidal conduct took place, and attending 
public events that rally for war criminals. It is these actions that 
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is no interest in joint cooperation among its country’s political 
elites to prosecute war crimes effectively so that victims may 
have access to equal and fair justice (Bell 2018a: 3). These actions 
by Bosnian political elites continue to undermine the process 
of justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reinforce harmful 
inter-group narratives that perpetuate divisions.
Considering justice and reconciliation beyond retribution: the 
need for dialogue
Since it has been established that the retributive measures 
utilized have not worked, I believe that the only way for 
Bosnians to move forward is to utilize other processes that 
actually do bring people together to talk about the past and 
decide on a shared narrative about the war and a collective. 
Moreover, this is not to say that war crime trials should cease, 
because they should not. War crime trials remain an important 
part of reconciliation, in terms of establishing truth, holding 
perpetrators accountable and developing facts, but as I noted 
earlier, one mechanism is not enough to foster reconciliation in 
many post-conflict societies. The ultimate goal of transitional 
justice mechanism and the discussions at the heart of the 
reconciliation process are change. In the same vein, Fischer 
(2011: 419) explains that the notion of change depends on 
long-term processes that combine factual truth, narrative and 
dialogical truth in order to overcome polarized, one-sided and 
selective views on the past. 
Moving on, non-judicial mechanisms have been attempted 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but largely by civil society actors 
and not the state. Mallinder (2013) points out that non-judicial 
transitional mechanisms have been attempted by civil society 
actors (ranging from establishing truth commissions to 
memorialization projects) have largely failed. This is largely 
due to the fact that there is little coordination among actors, 
including the State and very few resources to mobilize the 
public. Some projects have been led by organizations such as the 
Post Conflict Research Center, The Centre for Nonviolent Action 
based in Sarajevo and Belgrade, and the Youth for Human 
Rights Initiative. While these organizations have committed to 
fostering dialog and discussions about the war and justice, they 
are limited in their scope and outreach. For instance, one 
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Action has been to bring veterans from all sides of the conflict 
into schools to discuss their stories, their opinions on justice, 
and reveal the value of putting your differences behind you in 
order to move forward (Foden 2018: 5). This largely came about 
as a result of a fear that continued prejudice and intergroup 
animosity could lead to an eventual return to conflict. The hope 
is that these sessions in schools help transform the attitudes of 
future generations about the war (Foden 2018: 5).
To address issues that the courts and the ICTY did not address, 
in 2010 Bosnian authorities commissioned a National 
Transitional Justice Strategy tasked with addressing any 
unfinished business from the war. The Strategy aimed to focus 
on five key non-judicial mechanisms: truth and fact-finding, 
reparations, rehabilitation, memorialisation, and institutional 
reform. From what has been discussed throughout this paper, it 
is clear that many of these processes are needed to move Bosnia 
and Herzegovina forward. However, the implementation of the 
Strategy failed due to lack of political will from both elected 
officials and the general public. Like the ICTY or the domestic 
trials, there was not enough outreach to inform citizens about 
the purpose and importance of implementing the strategy’s 
measure.
Moreover, I would argue that the ultimate measures needed 
to move Bosnia and Herzegovina forward are truth-seeking 
ones. I do not necessarily mean that Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should have a truth commission, but I believe that establishing 
a concrete truth that moves outside of the area of forensics and 
more into the realm of narrative is important for the country to 
move on.  While one could argue that truth commissions have 
great merit, I would argue that an established state-wide truth 
commission would not somehow yield more facts than the 
ICTY has or that which will effectively change Bosnians’ 
current narratives from the war. Activists, journalists, and 
academics alike have come together to create a regional truth 
Commission called the Initiative for RECOM that aims to 
uncover all aspects of the Yugoslav Wars in a collective manner. 
While RECOM leaders and participants have garnered thousands 
of supporters across several Former Yugoslav states and have 
developed a Statue for the project, there seemingly has not 
been enough political and financial support to make it a 
reality.









XXV (84) 2019, 
54-77
establish another truth commission in the Republika Srpska 
to establish additional facts and figures about the war and 
in particular about the abuse of Serbs in Sarajevo. This is the 
second commission established by leaders in the Serb-led 
entity; the first was established in 2004 to generate facts about 
what happened in Srebrenica in July of 1995. However, the 
report from these proceedings was rejected by the Republika 
Srpska Parliament because it was argued that the coverage of 
the atrocities was not comprehensive enough. According to a 
report by  the Srpska Times (2018: para.1) “the Republika Srpska 
Parliament is of the opinion that for the sake of a comprehensive 
and truthful assessment of the events in and around Srebrenica 
in the period 1992-1995 and for the sake of strengthening 
mutual trust and tolerance between the peoples in BiH, it is 
necessary to form an independent international commission 
which would determine facts about sufferings of all peoples 
in that area and during that period of time in an objective and 
impartial manner.” However, the new commission soon to be 
established in 2019 has been condemned within Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and by international experts. Rudić (2019: para.2) 
explains notes that thirty-one international experts on the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia have written an open letter 
arguing that the commissions set up by Republika Srpska to 
investigate war crimes in Srebrenica and abuses against Serbs 
in Sarajevo during the 1990s conflict resemble revisionism 
rather than a genuine effort to establish truth or facts.
Beyond a truth commission, I would argue that a key way to 
change narratives is a measure that focuses on rebuilding 
inter-group relationships,such-as community conferencing 
in the form of structured dialogue sessions. The notion of 
community conferencing and dialog sessions is a form of 
restorative justice. The concept of restorative justice at its core 
is designed to rebuild relationships and communities. While 
is dialog projects are happening in more unofficial capacities 
around Bosnia and Herzegovina, I argue that they may carry 
more weight if they were state-supported and state-
sanctioned. While civil society can continue to work on 
these projects their resources and outreach is limited, as I 
have noted before. I also would argue that having the state at 
the centre of the process helps to show that governing 
institutions are also supporting the reconciliation and 
healing amongst the different groups. Moreover, I further 
argue that such mechanisms can be in the form of community 
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which will allow citizens to come together and discuss their 
perceptions of the war, individualize guilt to those who have 
committed the crimes, decided on how and what to memorialize 
from the war, and what the future should look like. However, 
more importantly this is a process that allows citizens to take 
charge of their own healing process and to recreate narratives 
that go beyond the scope of the political wrangling and inter-
group victimisation.
Dialogue expressly encourages and lays the foundations for 
inter-group reconciliation; it is not just about sitting around 
and talking about the past, it is also about challenging the 
way people talk, think, and communicate with one another. 
Dialogue requires self-reflection, spirit of inquiry and personal 
change to be present. In dialogue, there are no winners and 
losers. The aim of dialogue is to bridge communities, share 
perspectives, discover new ideas, and to challenge myths and 
half-truths (United Nations Development Programme 2009: 2-3). 
In this sense, one can argue that dialogue lays the foundations 
for socio-emotional reconciliation by bringing groups together 
to deal with the issues they have not dealt with due to being 
blocked by conflicting perspectives and narratives. Moreover, 
Pruitt and Kim (2004: 181) offer some great insight into how 
dialogue can change how former antagonists see one another. 
The authors assert that one key benefit of being in contact and 
dialoguing helps lift the veil of dehumanization. The authors 
additionally maintain that rather than seeing each other as 
evil and as one who enjoys inflicting pain upon one another, 
parties begin to see each other as fellow human beings who also 
suffers from the atrocities of the conflict (Pruitt and Kim 2004: 
181). This “humanization” fosters each party’s own empathy 
toward the other, creating an opportunity to include each other 
in both their moral communities; finally, the authors explain 
that contact and communication contributes to interpersonal 
attraction, and hence to the development of positive bonds 
(Pruitt and Kim 2004: 181). 
One unique aspect of utilizing dialogue sessions is that they can 
be creatively and loosely designed to fit a more general context 
in Bosnia, whereas other mechanisms like a truth commissions 
are more formalised. As far as a design for such a project, 
there are many examples that can be employed from across 
the globe. For instance, following civil war in Sierrea Leone, 
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sessions to address and help community members focus on 
achieving common goals (Post 2019: 93). These approaches 
particularly aim to build social capital between disparate 
groups in a community (Post 2019: 93). These dialogue sessions 
brought together between 4-5 neighbouring villages, who 
elected representatives from each community to participate 
in the dialogues (Post2019: 93). The dialogues focused on how 
Sierra Leoneans are one people that can unite in common goals. 
Meetings particularly focus on to uniting people, reducing 
community tensions, and lay foundation for later talks and 
cooperation (Post 2019: 93). A model such as this is feasible 
to be develop by state actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
promoted in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the Republika Srpska. This model would be cost effective, 
less complicated and not as politically controversial as 
designing a national truth commission. This model would 
also be an efficient way to promote national identity and 
challenge divisive ethno-political narratives. Additionally, this 
model could also be a unique way to collect information about 
attitudes and ideas concerning reconciliation from smaller 
communities across Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Another key example we can look to for fostering dialog are 
the community based Gacaca Courts in Rwanda following the 
1994 genocide, their main task was to create dialogue and bring 
victims, perpetrators, and fellow citizens together to confront 
the past so that they could move on.  In this way, I believe that 
dialogue can open the door to new understandings that move 
beyond the biases of media portrayals and the musings of 
political elites’ the events surrounding the 1992-1995 war, the 
crimes committed, and the trials that have taken place. The 
Gacaca Courts brought everyday citizens who suffered together 
and let them air their grievances and tell their stories. Often 
times in Bosnia this has been the exact opposite; stories of 
victims across ethnic (groups)are told by NGOs and or Victim 
groups that may have an ethnic and political stance or as noted 
earlier high jacked by political elites. A process like Gacaca in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina would allow victims to tell their own 
stories in raw and genuine ways without being politicised.
However, one key aspect to consider is that if these open 
dialogue and community sessions would actively transform 
the way everyday citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina thought 
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have to shift their stances. Therefore, it begs the question as 
to whether or not Bosnian political elites and members of 
the media would ever support such an initiative. If one stops 
to consider the possibilities, the inter-ethnic squabbling 
over competing victimhood and the fairness of post- conflict 
justice remains a key issue that keeps the citizens of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina divided?Which therefore gives political elites and 
the media legitimacy and in turn keeps both groups employed 
and empowered; so where exactly is the incentive to create and 
support projects that aim to reduce inter-group hostilities and 
finally push for a national narrative regarding the 1992-1995 
war?
Conclusion
This article aimed to explore to the concept of retributive 
justice and inter-group reconciliation through the context 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout this article it was 
discussed that both the ICTY and the domestic trials – 
while necessary to individualize guilt, punish perpetrators, and 
establish the truth – did not foster reconciliation in the way of 
rebuilding relationships or even establishing a shared vision of 
the war and the war crime sentences that followed. The trials 
have led to more ethnic divisions furthered by political elites 
and media outlets. Finally, I propose that a key way to foster 
reconciliation is to move beyond the realm of retributive 
justice. It was noted that there have been attempts from civil 
society organisations to further non-judicial transitional 
justice mechanisms, but they have largely failed and so has 
the government National Transitional Justice Strategy.  I argue 
that state-sanctioned dialogue sessions should be utilized, 
in order to help foster inter-group reconciliation by bringing 
people together to discuss the socio-emotional issues that that 
were not addressed through the tribunals in The Hague and 
domestic courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bringing everyday 
citizens together to tackle issues surrounding the 1992-1995 
war is important for creating ownership in the journey towards 
reconciliation that goes beyond the realm of retributive justice, 
it allows everyday citizens to create a new reality and narrative 
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